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Roanoke or Rockford: Two Divergent Approaches
to Antitrust Enforcement for Not-for-Profit
Hospital Mergers
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1988, the Department of Justice took a new step in its 98 year
history of federal antitrust enforcement. The Department chal-
lenged consolidations of non-profit charitable hospitals by bringing
injunctive actions designed to stop proposed transactions in Roa-
noke, Virginia, and Rockford, Illinois.' The two cases, decided only
ten days apart, exhibit very different approaches by the Courts in
respect to antitrust enforcement against nonprofit charitable hios-
pital mergers; namely: which sections of the antitrust laws should
apply, Section 7 of the Clayton Act2 or Section 1 of the Sherman
Act?3 The questions these divergent approaches leave to nonprofit
hospitals considering mergers are many; not the least of which is
what will be the direction of the higher courts when analyzing fu-
ture merges of nonprofit hospitals?
II. THE CLAYTON ACT
The first and perhaps the most important question to be an-
swered is whether Section 7 of the Clayton Act4 is applicable to
nonprofit hospital mergers. The Roanoke court dismissed the gov-
1. United States v. Carilion Health System, 707 F. Supp.840 (W.D.Va. 1989), hereinaf-
ter Roanoke, United States v. Rockford Memorial Corporation, 717 F. Supp. 1251 (N.D.Ill.
1989) hereinafter Rockford.
2. Section 7 of the Clayton Act states as follows:
"No person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other
share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission
shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of one or more persons engaged in com-
merce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line or commerce or in any activ-
ity affecting commerce, in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition of such
stocks or assets, or of the use of such stock by the voting or granting of proxies or otherwise,
may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C.A. §
18. (1982).
3. Section 1 of the Sherman Act states in part:
Sec 1. "Every contract, combination.., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several states or with foreign nations is hereby declared to be illegal. 15
U.S.C.A. § 1 (1982).
4. 15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (1982).
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ernment's Clayton Act claim.'
In dismissing the claim, the court noted that sec. 7 had two clauses one that
prohibited certain stock acquisitions and a second that barred certain assets
acquisitions by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission. The court found that the clause addressed to stock acquisi-
tions did not apply to defendants because no stock was involved in their
transaction. Both defendants are non-stock, non profit corporations. The
court also ruled that the assets clause did not apply either because the FTC
Act did not confer jurisdiction over nonprofit entities on the FTC.'
The government, by a motion filed during the trial, asked the
court to reconsider its ruling that section 7's stock clause does not
apply to the planned affiliation.
The government points out that defendant Carilion is a holding company
that through the affiliation will acquire control of defendant Community.
The government argues that even if Carilion cannot acquire Community's
stock, if it is consummated its planned acquisition of Community, it would
acquire Community's "share capital" thereby subjecting its transaction to
sec. 7 scrutiny. The government points to no case however, in which a court
has applied sec. 7 to a merger of non-stock, nonprofit corporations, and the
court again concludes that sec. 7's stock clause is worded so as to address
only acquisitions of stock or of an interest equivalent to stock. Community
which has no private owners, has not issued and by law cannot issue, any
share capital equivalent to stock, and sec. 7 therefore does not govern its
affiliation with Carilion.
7
Although the court in Roanoke stated that the government had
pointed to no case in which section 7 had been applied to a merger
of a non-stock, nonprofit corporation, only ten days later, the
Rockford court held that section 7 of the Clayton Act applied to
the proposed consolidation of two non profit hospitals.' In that
case, the government filed a verified complaint to prevent and re-
strain the merger of Rockford Memorial Corporation (RMC) and
Swedish American Corporation (SAC) and to adjudge the transac-
tion to be in violation of Section 7 of the Clayion Act and Section
1 of the Sherman Act.9
The defendant's position in Rockford with respect to the appli-
cability of section 7 to their proposed transaction is very similar to
the reading of section 7 provided by the Roanoke court. The de-
fendants rely on a literal reading of the first part of section 7 as
5. 707 F.Supp 840, 841 (W.D.Va 1989).
6. Id. n.1.
7. Id. See Mem. op. on Defendants Motion to Dismiss at 3-6 (Sept. 30, 1988).
8. 717 F. Supp. 1251 (N.D.Ill. 1989).
9. Id. at 1252.
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being made up of two provision-the first provision referring to an
acquisition of "stock" or "share capital" and the second provision
referring to an acquisition of "assets".1" The defendants in essence
argued that a nonprofit hospital does not have and by law cannot
have stock or for that matter share capital. This is in line with the
Roanoke courts statement that "the clause addressed to stock ac-
quisitions did not apply to defendants because no stock was in-
volved in their transaction. Both defendants are non-stock, non-
profit corporations."" Additionally, the Rockford defendants ar-
gued that the assets acquisition provision applied only to persons
under the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
and not-for-profit companies such as defendants are not under the
aegis of the FTC.12 Once again this line of reasoning is in accord
with the statement of the Roanoke court that "the assets clause
did not apply either because the FTC Act did not confer jurisdic-
tion over nonprofit entities to the FTC.' 1 3 The Rockford court
however rejected defendants interpretation of section 7 of the
Clayton Act and instead relied on an analysis of United States v.
Philadelphia National Bank14 to show that section 7 is indeed ap-
plicable to a merger of two entities outside the FTC's jurisdiction.
The Philadelphia National Bank case involved the proposed
merger between two banks not under the jurisdiction of the FTC.
The Philadelphia court began by analyzing the Celler-Kefauver
Antimerger Act' 5 which amended section 7 of the Clayton Act to
include an assets-acquisition provision. Although the court found
the legislative history silent on the specific questions of why the
amendment made no explicit reference to mergers, and why asset
acquisitions by corporations not subject to FTC jurisdiction were
not included, the Philadelphia court concluded that "Congress pri-
marily sought to bring mergers within section 7 and thereby close
what it regarded as a loophole in the section."' 6 The court went on
to find that the stock acquisition and assets-acquisition sections
when read together, (emphasis by court) reach mergers which fit
neither category perfectly but lie somewhere between the two ends
10. Id.
11. 707 F. Supp. at 841.n.1.
12. 717 F. Supp. at 1252.
13. 707 F. Supp. at 841 n.1.
14. 374 U.S. 321, (1963). hereinafter Philadelphia.
15. Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act, Act of December 29, 1950, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
16. 374 U.S. at 341.
1990
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of the spectrum. 7 So construed, the specific exception for acquir-
ing corporations not subject to the FTC's jurisdiction, excluded
from the coverage of section 7 asset acquisitions made by acquiring
corporations which were not accomplished by merger.'8 The court
further stated that "it is unquestioned that the stock acquisition
provision of section 7 embraces every corporation engaged in com-
merce, including banks. And it is plain that Congress in amending
section 7 considered a distinction for antitrust purposes between
acquisition of corporate control by purchase of stock and acquisi-
tion by merger completely unsupportable, and sought to overrule
the decisions of this Court which had recognized such a
distinction."'9
The Rockford Court essentially takes the analysis of the Phila-
delphia courts interpretation of section 7 as refuting the defend-
ants argument that the first provision of section 7 only reaches
consolidations accomplished through an acquisition of "stock" or
"share capital."20 The court finds that the bottom line to the Phil-
adelphia decision is that Congress amended section 7 in order to
reach mergers without qualification.2' Accordingly, the court finds
that section 7 of the Clayton Act reaches non-stock mergers by
persons not subject to the jurisdiction of the FTC and thus the
proposed consolidation of the two hospitals is subject to a section 7
Clayton Act analysis.22
17. Id. at 342.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 343.
The purpose of the proposed legislation [the 1950 amendments to sec. 7] is to prevent
corporations from acquiring another corporation by means of its assets, where under
the present law it is prohibited from acquiring the stock of said corporation. Since
the acquisition of stock is significant chiefly because it is likely to result in control of
the underlying assets, failure to prohibit direct purchase of the same assets has been
inconsistent and paradoxical as to the overall effect of existing law.
74 U.S. at 341, n.19.
20. 717 F. Supp. at 1254. Quoting from Philadelphia the court rules on the following:
"The specific exception for acquiring corporations [not merely banks] not subject to the
FTC's jurisdiction excludes from the coverage of sec. 7 only asset acquisitions by such cor-
porations when not accomplished by merger". 374 U.S. at 342. Further the court did not
limit to banks the following findings: "It is unquestioned that the stock acquisition provi-
sion of sec. 7 embraces every corporation engaged in commerce, including banks". 374 U.S.
at 343. "If therefore, mergers in other industries outside the FTC's jurisdiction were deemed
beyond the reach of sec. 7 the result would be precisely that difference in treatment which
Congress rejected." 374 U.S. at 333-34. Finally, the court explicitly acknowledges that "[w]e
have not overlooked the fact that there are corporations in other industries not subject to
the FTC's jurisdiction". 374 U.S. at 344 n.22.
21. Id. at 1256.
22. Id. at 1258.
Comment
Did the Rockford court strain the interpretation of the Philadel-
phia decision to apply section 7 of the Clayton Act to nonprofit
hospital mergers? Kopit and McCann in their article Toward a De-
finitive Antitrust Standard for Nonprofit Hospital Mergers28 ar-
gue that applying Section 7 to nonprofit charitable hospitals would
amount to a wholesale restructuring of the law without any sup-
port whatsoever in either the statutory language or legislative his-
tory.24 The authors appear to rely on the following from the Phila-
delphia case. Mergers and consolidations should be analyzed to a
covered acquisition of stock rather than a noncovered acquisition
of assets."8 The court emphasized that the legislative history of the
1950 Amendments supported the analogy: "When you talk about
mergers, you are talking about a stock transaction . ..Actually
what you do is merge the stockholdings of both corporations ...
and you issue stock in the one corporation in lieu of stock in the
other corporation . . . so it really is a stock transaction in the final
wind up regardless of what you call it."
'26
The authors argue that unlike the factual situation in Philadel-
phia, no stock will (or could) change hands in the typical merger,
consolidation or acquisition of one nonprofit charitable hospital by
another.2 7 Thus, unlike in Philadelphia there is no statutory ambi-
guity to resolve.28 The original Section 7 never reached nonstock,
nonprofit organizations at all and the assets acquisition language
added by the 1950 amendments cannot be said to have expanded
the statute in that regard when its terms explicitly exclude non-
profit corporations.29
Which interpretation of section 7 of the Clayton Act will other
courts follow? A literal reading of the act which results in section 7
23. Kopit & McCann, Toward a Definitive Antitrust Standard for Nonprofit Hospital
Mergers, JOURNAL OF HEALTH, POLITICS, POLICY AND LAW. Vol. 13., No. 4 (1988), 635.
24. Id. at 653.
25. 374 U.S. at 341.
26. Id. at 345.
27. Kopit & McCann, supra note 23 at 653.
28. Id.
29. Id. In footnote 60, the authors state:
moreover, any attempt to treat an affiliation between nonprofit hospitals as somehow
... analogous to the creation of a stockholding company would inject an internal
inconsistency into the Clayton Act. Asset acquisitions by nonprofit organizations are
excluded from coverage by the express language of the statute. The postulated anal-
ogy, therefore, would make jurisdiction over stock acquisitions broader than jurisdic-
tion over assets acquisitions rather than harmonize the two grants of authority. More-
over, the legislative history makes clear that jurisdiction over stock and asset
acquisitions was intended to be constructive.
1990
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not being applicable to nonprofit hospital mergers stated by the
Roanoke court; or an analogy to the Philadelphia case which per-
mits application of section 7 to nonprofit hospital mergers as read
by the Rockford court. The final analysis will likely rest on a num-
ber of issues some of which have not been discussed in either case.
One issue which will need to be explored further is whether the
nonprofit status of hospitals should be considered in the Philadel-
phia analogy. The Rockford court did not thoroughly address this
issue and it was recently noted that "there is a possible gap in the
FTC's jurisdiction over acquisitions involving nonprofit corpora-
tions.30 The Department of Justice, however, argues that the tax
and charitable status of hospitals or any business for that matter is
not relevant to merger enforcement.3
In the long run, the courts and maybe Congress, will decide the
applicability of section 7 to hospital mergers. However, it appears
that a literal reading of the statute may be a more prudent way to
proceed in light of the fact that there is no legislative history or
jurisprudential guidance related to the issue.
III. MARKET DEFINITION
When the proposed merger is analyzed under section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 2 the courts will typically use a "rule of reason"
analysis for determining whether most business combinations or
contracts violate the prohibitions of the Sherman Act.3 Whether a
particular combination is unreasonable depends on such factors as
the facts peculiar to the business in which the restraint is applied,
the nature of the restraint and its effects and the history of the
restraint and the reason for its adoption. 4 The Roanoke court re-
lying on Topco analyzed the proposed merger under the rule of
reason standard.
When the proposed merger is analyzed under section 7 of the
Clayton Act, the court must determine whether the challenged ac-
quisition may be substantially to "lessen competition" in that mar-
ket. 5 Proof of actual anticompetitive practices is not required;
rather evidence that these practices are likely to occur in the fu-
30. Hospital Corporation of America v. F.T.C. 807 F.2d 1381, 1390 (7th Cir. 1986).
31. Rule, Antitrust Enforcement and Hospital Mergers: Safeguarding Emergency
Price Competition, 21 JOURNAL OF HEALTH AND HOSPITAL LAW, 125 (1988).
32. 15 USC § 1 (1982).
33. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1972).
34. Id. at 607.
35. 374 U.S. at 362.
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ture is all that is necessary. This standard allows anticompetitive
tendencies to be arrested in their incipiency. 6
This protective standard was utilized by the Rockford court. The
first step in either analysis is to determine the product and geo-
graphic market. The Roanoke and Rockford courts differed in their
definition of product market. The Roanoke court concluded that
the relevant product market included both inpatient and outpa-
tient services. The court noted that because patients or their doc-
tors can choose to have problems treated in either a hospital or in
an outpatient clinic or doctors's office in a significant number of
cases, the court found that certain clinics and other providers of
outpatient services compete with the defendant's hospitals to treat
various medical needs.37 The Rockford court, on the other hand,
rejected defendants definition of a product market which included
both inpatient and outpatient care provided by all health care
providers, instead the court found that acute inpatient hospital
care is the economically significant submarket of the healthcare in-
dustry that should be analyzed for purposes of determining the
competitive effects on the defendants consolidation.38 The court
again relied on Philadelphia by referring to inpatient care as a
cluster of services and noting that the concept that a combination
or cluster of services could serve as a relevant product market was
adopted in Philadelphia.9 In rejecting defendants and for that
matter the Roanoke courts definition of product market, the court
had this to say "[T]he court agrees that there is interchangeability
between outpatient and inpatient services. The court however does
not agree that the relevant line of commerce includes outpatient
care." ° Thus we are left once again with two very different ap-
proaches to product market definition. Assistant Attorney Gener-
aly Rule, of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
adopts the Rockford definition when he states the services that
might comprise the relevant product market are limited to acute
care inpatient services because it is a hospital's provision of those
36. Id., citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. at 317, 322 (1962).
37. 707 F. Supp. at 845.
38. 717 F.Supp at 1259-1260.
39. Id. at 1260.
40. Id. at 1259. The court also relied on the definition of product market from In re
HCA where the FTC found that while hospital services may well have outpatient substi-
tutes, the benefit that accrues to the patient is derived from the complimentary cluster of
services and that there is no readily available substitute supplier of the benefit that this
complementing or combination of services confers on the acute care patient. Id. at 1260,
quoting from In re HCA 106 F.T.C. at 436, 466.
1990
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 28:561
services that most clearly distinguishes it from other health care
providers."' Others have argued that in competitive environments
where hospitals offer substantial services on an outpatient basis
and/or have meaningful nonhospital competition for their services,
a separate relevant market for non acute care services may need to
be defined.4 2 Given the variety of services which are provided by
today's hospitals and the many alternative delivery systems with
which they are in competition, it appears that the broader market
definition adopted by the Roanoke court more accurately describes
the "cluster of services" provided by hospitals.
The Roanoke court found the applicable geographic market to
be all of the counties and cities from which Roanoke Memorial
draws at least 100 patients a year.4'3 This broad definition resulted
in a geographic area comprising 16 counties, three independent cit-
ies of Virginia and three counties of West Virginia.44 While the Ro-
anoke court used a very straightforward definition of geographic
market, the Rockford court took information supplied by the de-
fendant to draw its own geographic boundaries. The methodology
they used in part is based on the Elzinga-Hogarty test,4 5 when
41. See, Rule supra, note 31 at 126.
42. Klingensmith, Applying Antitrust Concepts to the Acute Care Hospital Industry:
Defining the Relevant Market for Hospital Services. 13 JOURNAL OF HEALTH, POLITICS, POL-
ICY AND LAW, 153-62 (1988).
43. 707 F. Supp. at 847-48.
44. Id. at 848.
45. Rockford supra. at 1271. The Elzinga-Hogarty test uses the following
methodology:
Step l(a): Determine the merging hospitals service area, i.e., the area from which they
draw 90% of their business.
Step l(b): Determine the collective service area of all hospitals located within the
merging hospitals service area.
This area satisfies the LOFI test (i.e., little out from the inside).
Step 2: Determine the area containing those hospitals that supply 90% of all the
business that comes from patients residing in the collective service area.
This area satisfies the LIFO test (Little in from the outside).
The hospitals identified by this procedure are within the geographic market relevant
to the proposed merger. Id at 1267. It is also important to note that two well known
circumstances tend to overstate or understate the Elzinga-Hogarty test. The test can
understate its market when customers between two producers are divided between A
& B on either side of a point between A and B. These circumstances can produce one
market for A and another for B. However, in the event one producer sought to exer-
cise market power, customers may be willing to travel (out of the market) to the other
producer. In sum, the static market is smaller than the market after an exercise of
market power and thus by definition is understated. The test can overstate the mar-
Comment
used by the defendants, it resulted in a large (ten county) geo-
graphic market, the court instead found the test to be a useful tool
for eliminating certain geographic areas from consideration as rele-
vant markets. The courts rationale for keeping the geographic mar-
ket relatively small rested on three findings:
1. Physician and patient preferences for nearby hospitals is the main reason
for keeping the geographic market relatively small. The key of course is
physician admitting patterns to the three Rockford hospitals and the three
Rockford hospitals almost exclusively."
2. The evidence demonstrates that the patients who do travel from outside
the Rockford area do so a majority of the time for specialized care unavaila-
ble at their local hospitals.
7
3. The defendants themselves generally perceived that they compete with
one another and Saint Anthony Medical Center."
These three rationales led the court to believe that if there was a
small but significant non-transitory price increase at the defend-
ants hospitals, it is very unlikely that patients inside the Rockford
area would travel to the outlying community hospitals or that pa-
tients outside the Rockford area would stop inmigrating into Rock-
ford hospitals.49 The final geographic market was smaller than that
identified by the defendants but larger than the one requested by
the government.
As with all antitrust cases, the market definition is one of the
most important elements. Whether the courts will proceed with
the Rockford analysis, the Roanoke analysis or somewhere in be-
tween still needs to be resolved. Both approaches result in a rea-
sonable geographic market, but as with the product definition, the
final determination may depend on the community or type of hos-
pital involved. Professor Klingensmith of the University of Pitts-
burgh argued what appears to be in line with both courts analysis
that the relevant geographic market should turn on the competi-
tive environmental characteristics and product market definition.5"
ket where geographic price discrimination is employed. Because the product or ser-
vices cannot be resold, a producer could control the competitive effect of its exercise
of market power by pricing its services or produce differently to one segment of the
market as opposed to another. Id. at 1267, n.12.




50. See Klingensmith, supra, note 42 at 163. Table 2, for example:
Competitive Environments Characteristics: All hospitals offer comparable services to
the same population and have no other meaningful competition.
Product Market Definition: Clusters of activities knows as acute care services . ..
1990
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It is to the hospitals benefit to have the court accept a broad geo-
graphic market. Therefore, it is important that whatever definition
they use is backed up by verifiable statistics and if the Elzinga-
Hogarty test is utilized it is correctly applied. Also, when using it,
instead of shaping the market to fit preconceived notions, the ex-
aminer should simply allow the figures and market to take shape
and let the "appropriate" market and percentages rise to the sur-
face.3 1 The Department of Justice approach to geographic market
should also be noted. Rule stated that in most cases the geographic
market will be highly localized, reflecting the strong needs and
preferences of both patients and their physicians for convenience
for prompt service in time of emergency and for accessibility to
relatives and others in the community during a hospital stay.2
However, Rule does note that there may be cases where hospitals
serve product markets of different geographic scope and in that
case they may have broader geographic markets. Sometimes even
national as in the case of the Mayo Clinic."
IV. ANALYSIS AND DEFENSES
Once the product and geographic market are settled, the court
turns to an analysis of whether the proposed transaction will be in
violation of the Antitrust policies and particular statutes being ap-
plied. In Roanoke, the court used a rule of reason standard." They
noted that in analyzing a merger under section 1, the court must
evaluate the percentage of business the new merged entity would
control, the strength of remaining competition whether the action
springs from business requirements or purpose to monopolize, the
possible development of the industry, consumer demands and
other characteristics of the market. 6 Using this analysis, the court
generally measured in hospital beds or patient admissions.
Geographic Market Determination: That territory in which a patient reasonably
would seek alternative services of hospitalization for most medical needs.
Id.
51. 717 F. Supp. at 1272.
52. See, Rule supra, note 31 at 127. This principle is also well established in case law.
See In re American Medical International, 104 F.T.C. 177, 195 (F.T.C. opinion 1984) (rele-
vant geographic markets are both the city and county of San Luis Obispo); In re Hospital
Corporation of America, 106 F.T.C. 455, 466 (F.T.C. opinion 1985) market for general acute
care hospital services is the Chattanooga Urban area not the broader Chattanooga Metro-
politan Statistical Area) Rule supra, note 31 at 130, n, 14.
53. See, Rule supra, note 31 at 127.
54. 707 F.Supp at 846.
55. Id. at 847 quoting United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 527 (1948).
The court reads United States v. First National Bank and Trust Co. of Lexington 376 U.S.
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finds that the governments projection of a 70% market share to be
too much, however, the court never finally stated what the market
share was. Instead, they found the following which leads to a con-
clusion that the proposed transaction would not constitute an un-
reasonable restraint of trade under Sherman Act section 1.56
1. "Financial and legal barriers (reference to certificate of need laws and
licensed but not staffed beds) to expansion by existing hospitals cannot be
viewed as prohibitive, and so defendants various competitors in the geo-
graphic market would be able to expand their capacity if necessary in order
to compete more vigorously with defendants.
57
2. "Also relevant is the fact that defendants seek to merge in order to
strengthen rather than reduce competition. Based on Roanoke Memorial's
services need to expand and Community's need for more patients, they have
found various ways in which more efficient operations can save money and
thereby enable them to offer their services more competitively than ever to
the patients benefit. That business requirements and consumer demand,
rather than a monopolistic design motivate defendants to merge argues
strongly in favor of the planned mergers reasonableness"."
3. "Defendants nonprofit status also militates in favor of finding their com-
bination reasonable. Defendants boards of directors both include business
leaders who can be expected to demand that the institutions use the savings
achieved through the merger to reduce hospital charges which are paid in
many cases by employers either directly or though insurance carriers...
without deciding whether defendants nonprofit status should exempt their
merger from section 1 scrutiny, the court concludes that their nonprofit sta-
tus weighs in favor of their mergers being .reasonable".5 '
One other point which the court finds credible in reaching their
determination is that charitable, nonprofit hospitals tend to charge
lower rates than for-profit hospitals. Relative to other products
and services consumers buy, hospital services are not price sensi-
tive in the relevant market.60
By contrast, the Rockford court in its section 7 analysis finds
that "absent clear proof to the contrary, a horizontal merger vio-
lates section 7 of the Clayton Act if it produces a firm controlling
an undue percentage of the post merger market, and a significant
665 (1964) as not standing for the proposition that section 1 prohibits any merger between
major competitive factors in a relevant market. 376 U.S. at 673. By quoting Columbia Steel,
the court indicated that, as in any rule of reason analysis, courts must weight various fac-
tors, some peculiar to the industry under consideration, in analyzing a merger under § 1. 707
F. Supp. at 847.
56. Id. at 849.
57. Id. at 848-49.





increase in the concentration of the post merger market."6' To de-
termine whether the market concentration increased the court ap-
plied the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI),62 using three differ-
ent bases of market share: state inventoried beds, inpatient
admissions and inpatient days.63 The market before the merger has
an HHI above 1800.64 After the merger the increase is greater than
50 points which according to the Merger Guidelines, there is con-
cern that the merger may harm competition. 5 However, that pre-
sumption may be overcome by other factors such as ease of entry,
difficulty of collusion and efficiencies. 6
The Rockford court once again relying on Philadelphia found
that the resultant market shares to be inherently anticompeti-
tive.17 The court noted that in Philadelphia the pre-merger mar-
ket's two largest firms controlled a 44% share of the market, and
after the merger the top two firms would control 59% of the mar-
ket." By comparison, in the instant case, the two largest firms con-
trol approximately two thirds of the present market and after the
merger, the two largest firms will control 90% of the market.6 9 The
court continued with its analysis noting that in Philadelphia the
other important measure of anticompetitive behavior is whether
one firm will control an "undue percentage share of the relevant
market" as a result of the hospital merger.70 In this case, the
merged entity will account for nearly 70% of the beds, admissions
and inpatient days in the relevant market.71 In this regard, the
Philadelphia court found the following: "Without attempting to
specify the smallest market share which would still be considered
to threaten undue concentration, we are clear that 30% presents
that threat".
72
The Roanoke Court thus found that the merger would produce a
firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market
based on the 30% Philadelphia standard, and absent proof that
61. 717 F.Supp at 1279.
62. U. S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, as amended June 14, 1989, and
reprinted at 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 4490, (1986) (hereinafter Merger Guidelines).
63. 717 F. Supp. at 1280.
64. Id.
65. See Merger Guidelines, supra note 62 § 3.11(e).
66. Id.
67. 717 F. Supp. at 1292.
68. Id. at 1280 quoting Philadelphia, 374 U.S. at 365.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1281, quoting Philadelphia, 374 U.S. at 363.
71. Id.
72. Id. quoting Philadelphia, 374 U.S. at 364.
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the merger is not likely to have anticompetitive effects, the concen-
tration of the post-merger market will inherently lessen competi-
tion substantially in the relevant market.7 3 Here, once again, we
find a difference between the approaches taken by the Roanoke
court to determine that the proposed merger was reasonable were
not accepted by the Rockford court as proof that the merger would
not have anticompetitive consequences.
First, the Roanoke Court noted that "Financial and legal barri-
ers to expansion by existing hospitals [should not] be viewed as
prohibitive".' The Rockford Court, on the other hand, found that
the CON laws and the high costs of market entry are prohibitive
and that the CON laws would work to limit the expansion of ser-
vices or new market participants and as such "the barriers to entry
in the relevant market reinforce rather than diffuse the likelihood
of anticompetitive tendencies marked by a concentrated market.75
Second, the Roanoke court evaluated the business justifications
and proposed savings which would result from the merger and
found them to be reasonable.7 6 The Rockford court reviewed the
business justifications and proposed savings set forth by the de-
fendants and found them to be speculative at best and not neces-
sarily the type that can only be obtained from a merger.
7
Finally, the Roanoke court found that defendants non-profit sta-
tus and board make-up of Community representatives militated in
favor of finding their combination reasonable.78 The Rockford
court found that the defendants "consumer-aligned" boards and
not-for-profit status will not necessarily prevent the defendants
from engaging in anti-competitive activity.
79
One other defense which was not specifically discussed in Roa-
noke, but which the Department of Justice apparently allows in
hospital merger cases, is the "ailing hospital" defense.8 0 Rule states
that the Department is willing to consider the realistic prospects of
73. Id.
74. 707 F. Supp at 848-49.
75. 717 F. Supp. at 1282.
76. 707 F. Supp. at 849.
77. 717 F. Supp. at 1288-91.
78. 707 F. Supp. at 849.
79. 717 F. Supp. at 1285. The fact that the boards of the hospitals involved in this
case had worked together in the past to prevent Chicago Blue Cross from contracting with
them to provide healthcare at a rate below the level in defendants' previous contract. The
court noted that defendants' past conduct is one of the activities cited by this court as an
anti-competitive particularly suitable for the best merger market. Id. at 1286.
80. See, Rule supra, note 31 at 129.
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an ailing hospital's service as a circumstance indicating that the
hospitals' market share overstates its strength as a competitive
force in the market.8 The Rockford court found the "failing mar-
ket" or "writing on the wall" defense too broad and ungainly to
ward off a section 7 violation," particularly when both defendants
were solvent but future projections bode some financial trouble.2
V. CONCLUSION
The above comparison of the two courts' approaches shows that
there is a wide range of opinion between what is considered an un-
reasonable restraint of trade for non-profit hospital mergers and
what is not. It should also be noted here that the Department of
Justice did not challenge proposed mergers in Danville, Illinois,
and Portsmouth, Ohio, where the result of the merger was that the
new entity was the only hospital left in town. 83 Thus, it appears
that the non-profit hospital considering a merger has no clear path
to follow at this time. It may even be argued that there is no clear
cut definition of what unreasonable restraint of trade means in the
hospital context, particularly if as stated in Roanoke, the majority
of consumers are not price sensitive to hospital care and also "what
kind of monopoly has little or no control over 80 percent of its
business." 4
However, given the larger number of hospital closures this coun-
try is experiencing each year,8" it will become imperative that a
clear guideline be established for hospital mergers so that our com-
munity hospitals may realistically evaluate the options available to
them and take action before it is too late, not only for the hospital,
but for the patient. As Rule stated in his description of why the
Justice Department will consider the ailing hospital defense "con-
sumers of health care, unlike those of most products, will not nec-
essarily benefit from the market directed struggle to determine
which hospital will emerge victorious. Such a struggle could pro-
duce levels of care at the failing hospital that are inadequate from
81. Id.
82. 717 F. Supp. at 1289.
83. See, Rule supra, note 31 at 129-30.
84. Bryant, Should Not-For-Profit Organizations be Exempt from Antitrust Laws?
42(6) HEALTHCARE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, 70, 79 (1988). The author is argued that a
greater concern today is monopsony control by buyers over the demand for hospital services.
85. The American Hospital Association (AHA) reported that closures have increased
steadily from 1982 when only 23 hospital ceased operation to 1986 when a record number of
79 hospitals closed (Modern Healthcare 1988) Klingensmith at 36.
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a health care perspective, but which might not be apparent to pa-
tients choosing a hospital."86
Michele M. McKenney
86. See, Rule supra, note 31 at 129.
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